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Abstract
Design of appropriate interaction and human–machine interfaces for the handover of control between vehicle automation 
and human driver is critical to the success of automated vehicles. Problems in this interfacing between the vehicle and driver 
have led, in some cases, to collisions and fatalities. In this project, Operator Event Sequence Diagrams (OESDs) were used 
to design the handover activities to and from vehicle automation. Previous work undertaken in driving simulators has shown 
that the OESDs can be used to anticipate the likely activities of drivers during the handover of vehicle control. Three such 
studies showed that there was a strong correlation between the activities drivers represented in OESDs and those observed 
from videos of drivers in the handover process, in driving simulators. For the current study, OESDs were constructed during 
the design of the interaction and interfaces for the handover of control to and from vehicle automation. Videos of drivers 
during the handover were taken on motorways in the UK and compared with the predictions from the OESDs. As before, 
there were strong correlations between those activities anticipated in the OESDs and those observed during the handover 
of vehicle control from automation to the human driver. This means that OESDs can be used with some confidence as part 
of the vehicle automation design process, although validity generalisation remains an important goal for future research.
Keywords OESD · Handover · Driving automation · Interface design · Validation
1 Introduction
The design of the interface between human driver and vehi-
cle automation will be critical for successful handovers, 
especially when control of the vehicle is being handed 
back to the human driver (Eriksson et al. 2019; Eriksson 
and Stanton 2017a, b; Clark et al. 2019a). There are many 
examples of the failure to hand vehicle control back success-
fully, from both simulator studies (Banks et al. 2014; Stan-
ton et al. 1997) and real on-road collisions that have ended 
in fatalities (Banks et al. 2018a; Stanton et al. 2019). The 
problem of handing back control from an automated system 
to a human operator is not restricted to the road domain, as 
examples from aviation have shown (Stanton and Marsden 
1996; Salmon et al. 2016). In aviation, mode confusion in a 
perfectly functioning aircraft has led to situations whereby 
pilots have crashed. Air France flight AF447 is a case in 
point. The hand-back of control of the aircraft was misun-
derstood by the pilots, who seemed to think that the aircraft 
was in an over-speed condition. This is a classic example of 
mode confusion (Sarter and Woods 1995). The confusion 
led the pilot flying to pull back on the control stick, which 
induced a wing stall in the aircraft, causing the aircraft 
to drop into the ocean killing all on board (Salmon et al. 
2016). Mode confusion is also of great concern in automated 
road vehicles (Stanton et al. 2011). When vehicle control is 
handed back to a human driver, it is particularly important 
that the driver is aware of the vehicle status, road environ-
ment and pertinent road infrastructure as well as other road 
users (Stanton et al. 2017). Therefore, the design of the 
 * Neville A. Stanton 
 N.Stanton@soton.ac.uk
1 Human Factors Engineering, Transportation Research 
Group, Boldrewood Innovation Campus, University 
of Southampton, Burgess Road, Southampton SO16 7QF, 
UK
2 Edinburgh Napier University, Edinburgh, UK
3 University of Cambridge, Cambridge, UK
4 JaguarLandRover, Warwick, UK
 Cognition, Technology & Work
1 3
handover is critical for success (Banks et al. 2018b; Clark 
et al. 2019b; Eriksson et al. 2019).
A structured approach to design is required for developing 
the handover requirements and Operator Event Sequence 
Diagrams (OESDs) are one such approach amongst others 
(Stanton et al. 2013). OESDs were selected for this project 
because they had been used previously in simulator stud-
ies of driver handovers (Stanton et al. 2021). OESDs have 
been used in the design of human–machine interaction and 
interfaces for over 60 years (Kurke 1961). Since that time 
they have been used in a wide variety of applications, includ-
ing analysis of aircraft landing procedures (Sorensen et al. 
2011), evaluation of single pilot operations (Harris et al. 
2015), analysis of the relationship between air traffic control 
and flight decks on civilian airliners (Walker et al. 2010), 
analysis of the activities between maintenance operator in 
the field and operations in the central control room of an 
electrical energy distribution company (Salmon et al. 2008), 
comparison of traditional and new procedures for managing 
collision avoidance in the maritime domain (Kurke 1961), 
and comparing approaches to automatic emergency braking 
systems in road vehicles (Banks el al. 2014). OESDs repre-
sent the different aspects of systems (including the human 
operator, interfaces and technical elements) in separate col-
umns (colloquially called ‘swim-lanes’ in OESD parlance), 
against time.
Previous studies into the design of handover protocols for 
vehicle automation have found that the OESDs have good 
predictive validity, with median Phi of over 0.8 (Stanton 
et al. 2021). This means that the OESDs were able to pre-
dict the majority of the behaviours drivers engaged in dur-
ing the vehicle control handover process. In both of these 
studies, OESDs were constructed in workshops with experts 
in vehicle engineering, computing and human factors. The 
behaviour of the driver during that handover process was 
described in the driver column together with any interactions 
with other aspects of the vehicle (such as hearing or reading 
any information as well as making any verbal or physical 
responses). The drivers’ behaviours during the hand-back 
of vehicle control in the OESD were then compared to those 
observed in the video recordings from the driving simula-
tors. In the first study there were over 100 drivers in two 
separate driving simulators, one desktop (N = 49) and one 
full vehicle (N = 60). In both studies, the predictive validity 
of the OESDs was very good (Stanton et al. 2021). In the 
second study, there were 65 drivers undertaking 4 trials and 
the correlational data showed there was also a good predic-
tive validity for each trial (Stanton et al. 2021). As both 
of these previous studies report on data collected in driver 
simulators, so it is an important to see if these findings gen-
eralise to on-road studies. Whilst it may seem reasonable to 
expect the predictive validity of OESDs for the hand-back of 
vehicle control to human drivers in on-road studies to mirror 
those of driving simulators, it is important to test validity 
rather than assume it (Stanton and Young, 1999; Stanton 
2016). To that end, the OESDs were constructed prior to the 
on-road studies, as described in the next section.
2  Construction of OESDs
Further guidance on the development of OESDs may be 
found in Kirwan and Ainsworth (1992) and Stanton et al 
(2013). The analysis presented in this paper is based on 
a use-case of vehicle automation handover scenario on a 
UK motorway with a SAE level 3 vehicle (SAE 2016). It is 
assumed that drivers will drive manually onto the motorway 
and hand the driving task over to vehicle automation when 
it becomes available. Whilst vehicle automation is engaged, 
the driver is free to engage in non-driving tasks (such as 
reading, emailing, working on a tablet computer). The vehi-
cle would alert the driver of the need to take back control 
of the vehicle in a planned, non-emergency, handover in a 
timely manner before the exit junction. These handovers 
are described using the task elements from Operator Event 
Sequence Diagrams as shown in Table 1.
Table 1  Key for the Operator Event Sequence Diagrams
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The Operator Event Sequence Diagram shown in Figs. 1, 
2, 3, 4, and 5 were developed in workshops with Human Fac-
tors and Automotive Engineering experts. The 9 swimlanes 
show in Fig. 1 the different ‘actors’ under consideration in 
the design of the handovers to and from the human driver 
and vehicle automation (via the instrument cluster—instru-
ments viewed through the steering wheel), HUD (Head-Up 
Display viewed in the windscreen or windshield), centre 
console (the upper part of the centre of the dashboard), 
ambient (lighting around the dashboard and vehicle interior) 
and haptic (vibration through the driver’s seat) displays). 
The arrows are connectors that show the links between the 
events in the swimlanes. The handover protocol presented 
in Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 were designed to raise the situation 
awareness of drivers, by presenting them with contextually 
relevant questions about the vehicle status, other road users 
as well as the surrounding environment and infrastructure. 
This was based on the research evidence that degraded per-
formance of drivers of automated vehicles is, in part, due to 
poor situation awareness (Stanton et al. 2017). For example, 
the collisions in the Tesla and Uber vehicles report that the 
driver was not aware of the environment outside the vehicle 
(Banks et al. 2018a, b; Stanton et al. 2019). As can be seen 
in Fig. 1, it is assumed that the vehicle is under manual 
control until the system detects that the road is suitable for 
automation to operate. Then the system prompts the driver 
with the message that automation is available, via the four 
interfaces (cluster, HUD, centre console and ambient dis-
play) should they wish to use it.
If the driver chooses to engage vehicle automation, then 
they would press two buttons on the steering wheel with 
their thumbs simultaneously (assuming that their hands are 
in the ten-to-two clock position on the steering wheel). At 
this point, the interfaces would display “Automation Acti-
vated” followed by “The car is in control” (see Fig. 2). At 
the same time, the ambient lighting in the car would change 
from orange (indicating manual driving mode) to blue (indi-
cating automated driving mode). Then, the driver is able to 
Fig. 1  Vehicle in manual mode with automation available
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engage in non-driving tasks (on a tablet computer in this sce-
nario, as SAE (2016) level 3 is assumed, so there is no need 
for the driver to monitor the automated driving system). The 
scenario assumes that there is a planned handover of driving 
from automation back to the human driver (such as when 
their exit from the motorway is coming up, which would 
have been pre-programmed into the satellite navigation sys-
tem). The driver is given a 5, then 2, then 1 min notice that 
the handover process will begin (see Fig. 2).
Upon the prompt from the automated system that the 
driver needs to get ready to drive, it is assumed that the 
driver ceases the non-driving task, puts down the tablet com-
puter, and resumes the driving position (as shown in Fig. 3). 
The system then presents a series of questions designed to 
raise the situation awareness of the driver (such as: what 
speed is the vehicle currently travelling at? What lane are 
you currently in? What colour is the vehicle in front of you? 
What is your remaining fuel range? Can you see a bend in 
the road ahead?). The driver is expected to respond to these 
questions (which are presented auditorily as well as on all of 
the visual interfaces). If the answer is correct, then the next 
question is presented until all questions have been answered. 
If the answer is incorrect, then the question is repeated for 
a maximum of two additional times before moving onto the 
next question. When all questions have been presented, the 
handover interaction moves on to that presented in Fig. 3.
The driver is then requested to take manual control of the 
vehicle, which will mean placing both hands on the steering 
wheel and positioning their foot on the accelerator pedal. 
To transfer control from the automated system to the driver, 
they need to press two buttons mounted on the steering 
wheel at the ten-to-two clock position with their thumbs (in 
the same manner as they do for handing control over to the 
vehicle automation system), as shown in Fig. 4.
As Fig. 4 shows, the driver is then requested to take man-
ual control of the vehicle, which will mean placing both 
hands on the steering wheel and positioning their foot on 
the accelerator pedal. To transfer control from the automated 
system to the driver, they need to press two buttons mounted 
on the steering wheel at the ten-to-two clock position with 
their thumbs (in the same manner as they do for handing 
control over to the vehicle automation system).
When control of the vehicle is passed back to the human 
driver, the ambient lighting changes back from blue to 
orange (indicating the vehicle is now in manual driving 
mode) and the words “Automation deactivated” are pre-
sented auditorily as well as on the visual displays. This is 
followed by the words “You are in control”, which are also 
Fig. 2  Vehicle transferred to automated mode by human driver
Cognition, Technology & Work 
1 3
presented auditorily and on the visual displays (as shown in 
Fig. 5). The human driver is now driving the vehicle.
The next section describes the study in which the video 
data was collected from human drivers of an automated 
vehicle on the road. These data were used to validate the 
handover from vehicle automation to human driver, as 
show in Figs. 3, 4, and 5. The scientific contribution of 
this paper is the validation of OESDs in the context of the 
design of handover interaction and interface design. The 
research also aimed to demonstrate how the design of the 
handover between humans and machines could be facili-
tated by the use of OESDs. In addition, on-road studies 
of the nature undertaken in this research are exceedingly 
rare at the moment.
Fig. 3  Vehicle in automated mode preparing to transfer to manual mode
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3  Methods
The experimental methods used in this study covers the par-
ticipants, experimental design, equipment, procedure, data 
reduction and analysis.
3.1  Participants
Although 24 participants were recruited from a pool that had 
previously taken part in a simulator-based study featuring 
a similar HMI, data from only 16 was good enough to be 
used in this study due equipment and recording failures. All 
drivers held full UK driving licences. There were 10 males 
and 6 females. The age range of drivers was 29–67 years 
(mean = 46.3 years, SD = 11.7 years). Participants provided 
signed consent prior to involvement in the study that was 
approved by the University of Southampton’s Ethics and 
Research Governance Office (ERGO 49792.A2).
3.2  Experiment design
A repeated measures design was employed for the experi-
ment, covering three handover events using the default HMI 
settings, as shown in Fig. 6. 
The Driving Mode Wording is situated below the Driving 
Mode Icon, this is centrally placed in the infotainment dis-
play and cluster, and placed on the left side in the HUD. The 
colour acts as a mode indicator, blue indicating automated 
and orange for manual. Time to Takeover is shown in the 
bottom left corner of the Cluster and Infotainment Display, 
and the top right of the HUD. The Edge Frame mode indica-
tor is only visible on the Cluster and Infotainment Display. 
Handover Questions and associated icons appear in the cen-
tre of each of the HMI display elements (Fig. 7).
Video cameras were positioned around the interior cabin 
of the vehicle to record the driver interaction with vehicle 
automation so that it could be compared with the OESDs.
Fig. 4  Vehicle transferring from automated mode to manual mode
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3.3  Equipment
The experimental vehicle was a 2017 Jaguar iPace EV400 
AWD pre-production model. The automation system con-
sisted of a combination of factory standard Lane Keep 
Assist (LKA) and Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC). When 
utilising these systems, the standard car would issue a 
frequent warnings to maintain hands on the wheel, these 
warnings were specifically removed from the system for 
it to simulate SAE level 3 automation. The visual aspects 
of the HMI consisted of a 14″ TFT panel fitted to the 
centre console, a 10″ TFT fitted in place of the OEM 
cluster, and a HUD comprising a small 1000 × 250 px 
TFT and reflector screen (Bysameyee 2020). The car’s 
Fig. 5  Vehicle back in manual mode
Fig. 6  The customisation matrix 
displayed at the end of each trial 
on the vehicle’s infotainment 
display
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OEM cluster was moved into the passenger footwell 
to allow monitoring by the safety driver. The interac-
tive element of the HMI constituted two illuminating 
green buttons fitted in the thumb positions of the steer-
ing wheel (approximately at the 10–2 clock position). 
Ambient lighting was supplied via LED lighting strips. 
Haptics were provided in the seat base via Leggett & 
Platt motors controlled through an Arduino Micro and 
motor control board. Five KT&C cameras were installed 
within the iPace to provide footage from the forward 
view, driver facing, over-the-driver-shoulder, footwell 
and rear views. A dashcam was also fitted in the safety 
car to collect footage of the participants’ vehicle from an 
external viewpoint. The test vehicle was a 2017 Jaguar 
iPace EV400 AWD and Fig. 8 shows the car in manual 
mode with the HUD and cluster visible.
In addition, the n-back task presented a continuous stream 
of digits aurally to the driver who was required to repeat 
1-back from the digit being presented (AgeLab 2019). This 
was used a way of loading the working memory of the driver 
to cognitively distract from the driving task. Ideally, when 
in automated mode, the driver would have been distracted 
visually from the road environment but this was not allowed 
due to the risk assessment. This was the reason for introduc-
ing the n-back task. It was reasoned that this was a cogni-
tive distraction (albeit not a visual one). Nevertheless, it did 
enable the study to go ahead as the project faced significant 
technical. legal and ethical challenges to undertake a study 
Fig. 7  This interfaces in automated mode, showing centre infotainment display (left), head-up display (top right) and instrument cluster (bottom 
right)
Fig. 8  The left-hand image shows the green buttons on the steering 
wheel and the infotainment display (ambient blue lighting indicates 
that the vehicle is in automated mode). The driver-facing camera can 
be seen fitted on the dashboard. The figure on the right shows the car 
in manual mode with the HUD and instrument cluster
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on British motorways. In any case, we were studying the 
planned hand-back of the vehicle control from automation to 
the human driver, in which it was anticipated would involve 
a period of the driver sampling the road environment before 
the handover began AgeLab (2019).
3.4  Procedure
On arrival at the JLR facility at Fen End, the participant 
was welcomed and asked to sign in, presenting their driving 
licence and receiving a visitor pass. They were then briefed 
on the aim of the project and how the on-road study follows 
on from the simulator study that they completed the previous 
year. A brief explanation of the sequence of events for the 
study was then given. This included the route, the takeover 
procedure, form filling on trial completion, customisation of 
the HMI and the n-back cognitive load task (to simulate the 
driver undertaking another (verbal) task whilst the vehicle 
was being driven by the automation). It was stressed that 
they were required to maintain the same level of attention 
as if they were driving and be ready to take control at all 
times. They were also advised that if the cognitive load task 
was detrimentally affecting their ability to retain a safe level 
of attention, they should stop the n-back task. They were 
presented with a copy of the participant information sheet, 
this same sheet was made available to them when they were 
recruited. A reminder sheet showing screenshots of the HMI 
they would be using was provided, including modal variation 
of the cluster, HUD and IVI, the green buttons and the cus-
tomisation matrix screen. They were shown a route map that 
highlighted where the trials would take place, but also areas 
of caution and one junction that required traversal in manual 
mode. A privacy policy was presented, and a sheet explain-
ing the cognitive load n-back task was provided along with 
a brief verbal explanation. The participant was asked if they 
had any questions, and if they were happy to continue, they 
were provided with two consent forms, an attendance form 
and an events team form to sign. On completion of all forms, 
they were lead from the reception area to the car park, and 
asked to sit in the passenger side of the car, both experiment-
ers took their places in the rear seats. The participant was 
introduced to a safety driver who explained the basic con-
trols on the car, and the elements of the interface. The safety 
driver then drove the car through security to the proving 
ground and demonstrated the vehicle’s performance before 
running through the transition to automated mode and back 
to manual control. The automation system was operated by 
one of the experimenters using a Wizard of Oz system, from 
a Windows tablet in the back of the car. To offer automa-
tion, an experimenter would press a start button on a custom 
control panel app running on the tablet; the HMI then indi-
cated automation as being available via the three graphical 
interfaces and a vocal alert. To enable automation, the driver 
simultaneously pressed the two green buttons mounted on 
the steering wheel and released all of the controls, includ-
ing the accelerator. The system would then engage automa-
tion and the HMI would indicate that the automated mode 
was active. During automation, the cognitive load task was 
controlled by the other experimenter via a mobile telephone-
based app linked to a Bluetooth speaker. The safety driver 
demonstrated the automation system multiple times includ-
ing the n-back task, and requested the safety car overtake 
and brake in front of the vehicle, when in automated mode, 
to illustrate how it reacts to maintain a gap to the car in front. 
The safety driver then stopped in a safe area and swapped 
places with the participant. The participant then was allowed 
some time to drive the car on the proving ground to become 
familiar with the controls. The automation was then made 
available to them and they experienced multiple handovers 
and takeovers, including the use of the n-back task whilst in 
automated mode.
The participant was asked to drive manually to the start 
point of the experiment at the Southbound Warwick services 
on the M40. Two miles prior to the services, whilst on the 
M40, a road-based practice handover was conducted. The 
automation was offered to the participant, once activated, 
a short 30 s period of automation followed which included 
the participant carrying out the n-back task. The participant 
then experienced the handover protocol and resumed manual 
control before stopping at the services. After confirming that 
the participant was happy to continue, the on-board systems 
were checked and configured for the first trial. data logging 
was started, and the video and audio was synchronised using 
a clapper board.
The participant was instructed to drive from the ser-
vices onto the M40, proceeding in the left lane at approxi-
mately 58mph. After 1 min of manual driving, automation 
was offered to the participant. Once activated, after a fur-
ther period of 30 s, the n-back cognitive loading task was 
started. This task was run in 2 min intervals, separated by 
30 s. Following 10 min of automation, the HMI started the 
takeover protocol, once completed, the participant pressed 
both steering wheel buttons and resumed manual control. 
After one minute of manual control, automation was again 
offered to the participant and the process repeated. On com-
pletion of the second handover, the manual driving period 
was extended to approximately 7 min, this was to pass a 
section of motorway (M40 J9 Southbound) that would have 
adversely affected the automation due to the lane becoming 
a sliproad. Due to proximity to the end point of trial 3, the 
automation period was reduced from 10 min to 8 min. The 
n-back task was started simultaneously with the automation 
for 30 s, before reverting to 30 s off and 2 min on until the 
protocol started. When the participant completed the proto-
col and assumed manual control, they continued in manual 
mode the short distance remaining to the motorway services 
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and parked the car. This concluded the data collection the 
trial and safety driver swapped places with the participant 
from this point and drove the vehicle back to the JLR facility 
at Fen End. The participant was thanked for their time and 
signed out at reception.
3.5  Data reduction and analysis
The validation of the OESDs was assessed by comparing 
the video data collected on the road of the driver during the 
automation handover process with those tasks identified in 
the OESDs. In the OESDs, 15 tasks were defined as follows:
 1. Receive “Get Ready to Take Over” Information
 2. Resume Driving Position
 3. Receive SA Question 1
 4. Answer Question 1
 5. Receive SA Question 2
 6. Answer Question 2
 7. Receive SA Question 3
 8. Answer Question 3
 9. Receive SA Question 4
 10. Answer Question 4
 11. Receive SA Question 5
 12. Answer Question 5
 13. Receive “Take Control Now” Information
 14. Received Transition Information
 15. Press Manual Buttons
These data were processed using the signal detection par-
adigm (Green and Swets, 1966) which discerns between four 
events: Hits, Misses, False Alarms (FA), and Correct Rejec-
tions (CR). In the context of this experiment, it provided 
a method by which to compare predicted driver behaviour 
illustrated on OESDs with driver behaviour, observed during 
the on-road trials of the vehicle control handover process (as 
shown in Fig. 9).
The four events in Fig. 9 are defined for all driving-related 
tasks as follows:
Hits: present in Operator Event Sequence Diagram and 
present in the video of automation-driver handover.
Misses: not present in the Operator Event Sequence Dia-
gram but present in the video.
False alarms: present in the Operator Event Sequence 
Diagram but not present in video.
Correct rejections: not present in Operator Event 
Sequence Diagram nor in the video (Unique misses by all 
participants minus the individual participant’s misses).
The latter category can be difficult to calculate as it 
could be infinity, but for the purposes of this investigation, 
it should be based on the total number of unique misses 
generated by all of participants, minus the number of misses 
for each individual participant. Additional the Hit Rate and 
False Alarm Rate were calculated as follows:
Inter-rater reliability testing was conducted on the catego-
risation scheme for approximately 20% of the video footage 
between two analysts. Equal weighted Cohen’s Kappa was 
calculated (0.781) showing acceptable agreement between 
the two independent analysis in their classification of hits, 
misses, false alarms and correct rejections (Landis and Koch 
1977).
Finally, Matthews (1975) correlation coefficient (Phi—a 
correlation coefficient for dichotomous data) was applied to 
the data generated by the SDT analysis, this quantified the 
correlation between the expected and observed behaviour, 
as a means to validate the OESDs. The Matthews correlation 
coefficient formula is shown as follows:
Phi was selected as an appropriate statistic for validation 
of Human Factors methods, as it has been used previously 
with some success (Stanton and Young 1999, 2003). In par-
ticular, the method of categorising the data offers a way of 
correlating predicted driver behaviour with that observed 
in the videos.
Hit Rate = Hits∕Hits +Misses,
False Alarm Rate = False Alarms∕False Alarms
+ Correction Rejections.
 =
Hit × CR − FA ×Miss
√
(Hit + FA)(Hit +Miss)(CR + FA)(CR +Miss)
.
Fig. 9  Signal detection theory (SDT) matrix
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4  Results
The data from the three handovers from the automated 
vehicle to the human driver are summarised in Table 2 for 
each participant. As there were 15 tasks per handover, 45 
hits represent a perfect score, meaning all of the tasks in 
the OESD were observed in the video. One participant had 
13 False Alarms because they cut the handover short by 
assuming control of the vehicle without passing through 
all of the preceding tasks (participant 22). The misses 
are shown in Table 3 with the frequencies by handover. 
As there was a total of 6 unique misses per handover 
(observed from the video data), the total correct rejections 
were 18 if none were observed. Hit rate, false alarm rate 
and Phi were calculated as described in the data reduction 
section.
The misses are an interesting category of events, as they 
describe activities that were not predicted by the Operator 
Event Sequence Diagram but were present in the video 
of the driver. Over half of the misses (15/29) related to 
the driver covering the green buttons on the steering 
wheel with their thumbs (the 10–2 position), early on in 
the handover process. This is not a safety concern, how-
ever, as shows that the drivers were readying themselves 
to resume manual control. On one occasion, the driver 
failed to assume the driving position at the right point in 
the process (task 2), as they remained with their hands on 
their lap and their feet away from the pedals. The only con-
sequence of this is that it increases vehicle control hando-
ver time, but as this time is entirely driver paced there is 
no adverse consequence for safety. On one occasion, a 
driver (participant 22) took control over the vehicle early 
in the process, which shorted the handover protocol con-
siderably. Whilst any handover protocol should not hamper 
drivers of be overly intrusive, there is a fine balance of 
ensuring that the drivers awareness has been raised suffi-
ciently for them to resume control of the vehicle (Stanton 
et al. 2017). Six drivers did not assume driving position 
until right at the end of the handover protocol, whereas it 
had been anticipated that they would be in this position 
from the start. Again, they were no safety implications 
from this behaviour. Five participants removed their hands 
Table 2  Presentation of data 
by participant (rounded to two 
decimal places*)
Participant Hits Misses FA CR Hit rate* FA rate* Phi*
1 44 1 1 17 0.98 0.056 0.92
2 44 8 1 10 0.85 0.09 0.63
3 45 2 0 16 0.96 0 0.92
4 45 3 0 15 0.94 0 0.88
7 45 0 0 18 1 0 1
8 45 1 0 17 0.98 0 0.96
9 45 3 0 15 0.94 0 0.88
12 45 1 0 17 0.98 0 0.96
13 45 0 0 18 1 0 1
17 45 1 0 17 0.98 0 0.96
19 45 3 0 15 0.94 0 0.88
20 45 3 0 15 0.94 0 0.88
21 45 0 0 18 1 0 1
22 32 3 13 15 0.91 0.46 0.49
23 42 0 3 18 1 0.14 0.89
24 45 0 0 18 1 0 1
Table 3  Misses in the three 
handovers from vehicle 
automation to human driver
Misses Handover 1 Handover 2 Handover 3 Total
Failed to assume driving position 1 0 0 1
Covered buttons with thumbs 6 4 5 15
Took control early 1 0 0 1
Assumed driving position at end 1 1 4 6
Removed hands during protocol 1 1 3 5
Assumed driving position early 0 1 0 1
Total 10 7 12 29
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from the steering wheel during the course of the hando-
ver, having previously placed them on the wheel. Finally, 
just one driver assumed the driving position before the 
protocol had started. In summary, none of these misses 
presented any safety concerns to the study, particularly as 
the handover was at the paced of the driver rather than the 
vehicle automation.
As Fig. 10 shows, most of the hits were almost at the 
maximum level (n = 45), except to 2 participants, most 
notably participant 22, who resumed manual control early 
from the automaton system for one of the 3 handovers, 
which also generated the most false alarms. Participant 2 
is less of an outlier, being just below the mean for the hits 
and just above the mean for the false alarms in the box-
and-whisker plots. Participant 2 also has more misses, and 
consequentially fewer correct rejections, than the other 
participants. Misses were generally quite low and correct 
rejections were high for most participants.
Given the findings in Table 2, it is no surprise that the 
hit rate is high and the false alarm rate is low, as shown 
in Fig. 11. Again, there are the outliers of participants 
2 and 22 for false alarm rate, with the latter being more 
pronounced. This mean that missing task steps out in the 
return of control to the human driver is more likely to 
affect the predictive validity of the OESDs.
Finally, Phi (the correlation coefficient for dichotomous 
data) averaged from all the individual coefficients, as shown 
in Fig. 12, reveals good predictive validity for OESDs, above 
0.8 (which is generally considered to be the criterion for cor-
relational data). The two outliers are again participants 2 and 
22. The latter being the lower Phi coefficient.
In summary then, this means that OESD have been shown 
to be good predictors of the observed handover behaviours 
when going from automated control to manual control in 14 
of the 16 cases.
5  Discussion
The main finding from the on-road study of handovers from 
vehicle automation to human drivers is that the OESDs 
predicted most of the observed activities. To that end, the 
findings of the study mirrored those from simulator studies 
undertaken previously (i.e. median Phi > 0.8), albeit with 
a much smaller sample (Stanton et al. 2021). In addition, 
all handovers from vehicle automation to human driver 
were successful, in that they largely followed the protocol 
designed in the OESD, with the exception of two partici-
pants (numbers 2 and 22) who, for one of their three hando-
vers, took control of the vehicle back early. Nevertheless, 
Fig. 10  Box-and-whisker plots 
for hits, misses, false alarms 
(FA) and correct rejections 
(CR)
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there was no evidence of mode confusion in any of the hand-
overs (Sarter and Woods 1995; Stanton et al. 2011). There-
fore, as an exercise in design, we may conclude that OESDs 
was a useful Human Factors method (Kurke 1961; Kirwan 
and Ainsworth 1992; Stanton et al. 2013), and was able to 
predict automation-driver handover behaviour. There is a 
contemporary discussion within the Human Factors com-
munity about whether or not ‘work as imagined’ matches 
‘work as done’ (Hollnagel 2015; Read et al. 2018). There-
fore, although we used the OESD to design the interaction 
and interfaces, there is no guarantee that the drivers would 
behave in a way we imaged they would in the OESD model. 
In fact, two of them did not, which proved the point. That 
14/16 drivers did indeed behave the way we ‘predicted’ they 
would (in the sense that the OESD is both a model of the 
system and a prediction of driver behaviour) is some cause 
for celebration that the method ‘works’. This mean that, to 
some extent at least, ‘work as imagined’ did indeed match 
‘work as done’.
The validation performance of the OESDs is comparable 
with the best of the Human Factors methods (Stanton and 
Young 1999; Stanton et al. 2013). Some of the best methods 
in the field include those associated with prediction of task 
performance time (Card et al. 1983; Baber and Mellor 2001; 
Fig. 11  Box-and-whisker plots 
for hit rate and false alarm (FA) 
rate
Fig. 12  Box-and-whisker plot 
for Phi
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Stanton and Baber 2008; Harvey and Stanton 2013; Moray 
et al. 2017) and prediction of human error (Baber and Stanton 
1996; Harris et al. 2005; Stanton and Baber 2002, 2005; Stan-
ton el al. 2009). Whilst a wide range in the predictive perfor-
mance of Human Factors methods has been observed (Stanton 
and Young 1999), those better performing methods typically 
achieve validity statistics in excess of 0.8 (which in correla-
tional terms is generally considered to be of strong predictive 
value). OESDs appear to be performing as well as could be 
expected, for the limited range of automation handover tasks, 
both in driving simulators and a real vehicle on the road.
Whilst the validation evidence for the practical application 
of OESD is growing, we cannot assume validity generalisation 
until more extensive studies have been undertaken. This means 
that it is an important goal for researchers to undertake studies 
with larger numbers of participants and in a broader range of 
applications and domains. So far studies have been limited to 
automation-driver handover tasks and, with the exception of 
this latest on-road study, mainly in driving simulators (Stan-
ton et al. 2021). As an engineering discipline, Human Factors 
needs be able to provide evidence that its methods actually 
work (Stanton and Young 2003; Stanton et al. 2013; Stanton 
2016). This means providing evidence for the validity and reli-
ability of the methods to support their continued use.
There is little by way of studies of reliability for OESDs, 
which is a shortcoming in the research. Reliability has two 
facets (Stanton and Young 1999; Stanton 2016), stabil-
ity over time (called intra-analyst reliability) and stability 
between people conducting the analysis (called inter-ana-
lyst reliability). Establishing both forms of reliability is 
an important future goal for the methodological research 
into OESD. The repeatability of a method, both within and 
between analysts, would give confidence in it continued use, 
although it should be noted that OESDs have been in con-
tinuous use for over 60 years without this evidence.
Also little has been written on training people to use 
Human Factors methods (including OESDs), as noted by 
Stanton and Stevenage (1998). Stanton and Young (1999, 
2003) report on an evaluation of the ease with which novices 
were able to acquire expertise in Human Factors methods. 
They should quite a large spread of training times which 
is, to some extent at least, associated with the complexity 
of the methods tested. No such study has been reported on 
the ease or difficulty in acquiring expertise in developing 
OESD. This represents a gap in knowledge about Human 
Factors methods, although there are estimates reported in 
Stanton et al (2013). Typically, the most popular Human 
Factors methods are those that are quick to learn and apply 
(Stanton et al. 2013). More research could be undertaken to 
streamline methods and improve their ease-of-use. Future 
research could also investigate using the predictive power of 
OESDs to model performance variability affected by human 
factor issues such as underload, fatigue or overreliance. This 
might involve developing a variety of models for the same 
task to compare with attentive drivers who are not suffering 
from the effects of underload, fatigue or overreliance. The 
benefit of such models could be to help the designers of such 
systems anticipate potential driver maladies and design was 
to alleviate the symptoms or prevent them from occurring 
in the first place.
There were some limitations to this study, which are 
worth noting in terms of full disclosure. First, the sample 
size was very limited for claims about predictive validity of 
a method, although the Matthews (1975) Correlation Coef-
ficient was chosen as an acknowledgement of the sampling 
problem. Second, the modelling of the cognitive activities 
was problematic. Whilst it may be useful to disassociate the 
reception of visual-auditory messages from the responses 
to them for the purposes of system design, it was it was 
difficult to disentangle the reception of information from 
the answering of questions in the analysis of the videos. 
This may have led to an artifactual inflation of Phi, as every 
cognitive activity would be accompanied by the associated 
physical activity. Nevertheless, we do consider it important 
to include both cognitive and physical activities on OESD. 
Further methodological work is required on the approach. 
Third, the scope of the study was limited to the handover 
from vehicle automation to human driver. A wider range of 
task and domains is required to determine validity generali-
sation. We are not claiming that the OESDs presented in this 
study can be generalised to all SAE level 3 driving, rather 
we are arguing that OESDs can provide a good model, and 
prediction, of driver behaviour. Finally, as discussed previ-
ously, reliability of the method should be established over 
time as well as between analysts.
6  Conclusions
OESDs are able to predict handover behaviour from vehicle 
automation to human driver in on-road trials. Although the 
sample size for this study was quite small compared to the 
previous driving simulator studies, the findings are encour-
aging and a large sample size for future work is to be encour-
aged. For now, the use of OESDs for developing design of 
the interfaces between vehicle automation and human driv-
ers seems to be reasonable. An important goal for future 
research is to establish the reliability of OESD generation, 
both within and between analysts, as well as validity gener-
alisation across a broader range of domains and application.
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